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THE ISSUE
Reforming the governance of the European Union has become urgent for three reasons: 
to better deal with politically-sensitive topics, to manage greater external challenges 
and because future EU enlargement will increase the diversity of the bloc’s member-
ship. The answer to disagreement typically has been qualified majority voting, but on 
sensitive topics, the EU has increasingly moved to unanimity and heavy European 
Council involvement, which has often not delivered results. The alternative answer has 
been a Europe of multiple speeds of integration with one shared goal for all, increasing 
political tensions. A different approach is now needed to move Europe forward.
POLICY CHALLENGE
Two options would be a Europe of concentric circles and a Europe of ‘clubs’, but the 
former would cement tensions between the inner and the outer circles, while the latter 
would lead to unclear structures and an end to cohesion. However, a governance model 
could combine the two approaches. The model would be based on a strong ‘bare-bones 
EU’ formed by the single market, trade and accompanying policies, the European 
institutions, treaties, rule of law and a commitment to fundamental EU values. Three 
policy areas would be completely moved into ‘clubs’ while remaining based on the 
bare-bones legal and institutional structure: economic and monetary union; Schengen 
and asylum policy; and foreign and security policy and neighbourhood policy. Club 
membership would be optional but once in, countries would have to accept the rules 
and there would be high hurdles to leaving. Finally, a ring of friends would surround 
the bare-bones EU, based on very close economic relationships and some multilateral 
discussion elements, but no formal votes.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The strong global anchor of which the 
European Union has been part since its 
inception – rules-based multilateralism 
– is unravelling. A multipolar regime is 
emerging faster than anybody antici-
pated. Will it be an international order? 
Will it have rules, and if so who will 
write them? Because of its size, Europe 
is bound to be one of its poles, but will 
Europe be strong enough to shape its 
own future or will its future be deter-
mined by others? In other words, will 
the EU be a sovereign player commen-
surate with its size? These are questions 
Europe must urgently answer. 
As if these global questions were 
not hard enough, they arise at a 
time when the EU is having doubts 
about its own future. This is not just 
because of Brexit. Strong political 
forces in other member states, 
including the six original members, 
are questioning the direction, even 
the principle of European integration. 
Some basic tenets of EU treaties no 
longer command consensus. Internal 
unravelling has become a real threat. 
At one level this coexistence of 
external and internal questioning 
is paradoxical, because a strong, 
united European stance is even more 
required in a world in which global 
rules and institutions threaten to fall 
apart. But at another level, it is logical: 
sovereignty starts at home, and the 
same isolationist forces that undermine 
the global multilateral order undermine 
the European multilateral order. This 
is the tension the EU must solve. If it 
fails, it could lose its raison d’être. If it 
succeeds, it could find a new purpose. 
The issue of EU heterogeneity is 
not new. In their contribution to the 
‘Monitoring European Integration’ 
series, Dewatripont et al (1995) 
discussed exactly this problem. 
Similarly, the European Commission’s 
March 2017 white paper on the future 
of Europe1 offered different scenarios, 
motivated by the inability to establish 
consensus. But we emphasise the 
urgency of the issue and how, in 
a dangerous global environment, 
Europe’s ability to remain in charge 
of its destiny might be compromised 
by a failure to manage these issues 
effectively. This has made it more 
urgent to reform the EU to meet the 
challenges of tomorrow. Ad-hoc 
solutions to the challenge of 
heterogeneity do not appear to be 
enough, especially in a context of 
enlargement and deeper internal 
divisions.
2 THE LEGACY
Since the outset, the EU was conceived 
and designed as a single undertaking 
in which all member countries would 
eventually participate in full in all 
policies, though in some cases after 
a transition period. Accordingly, the 
acquis was regarded as indivisible 
and participation in it was considered 
irreversible. For decades, indivisibility 
and irreversibility provided extremely 
powerful lock-in mechanisms.    
Now, and as the EU has increased 
its membership, this unitary model is 
being questioned by increasingly deep 
divisions over the aims of European 
integration. 
The unitary model is also brought 
into question by the stalemate in 
the accession process. Some current 
members have no appetite for enlarging 
the EU to countries where the economic 
and institutional level is such that their 
participation in the EU could hamper 
deep integration and the strengthening 
of the common regulatory framework, 
could be the source of significant labour 
migration and could further dilute the 
incumbents’ institutional power within 
the EU. The result is that, without an 
alternative multilateral framework for 
integration, these weak countries are left 
in a limbo. This is detrimental to their 
development and their stability. Some 
might even turn their backs on the EU 
and look for alternative alliances. The 
traditional answer to such challenges has 
been two-fold: multi-speed integration 
and majority rule.
1.   See: https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/white-pa-
per-future-europe-reflec-
tions-and-scenarios-eu27_
en.
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2.1 MULTI-SPEED INTEGRATION
First, it has been to stay the course but 
buy time: to continue to call for an ever 
closer and ever wider union, in which all 
members eventually transfer sovereignty 
to a federal level, while envisaging long 
transition periods with the possibility for 
member states and applicants to proceed 
at different speeds, depending on their 
preferences and readiness. 
The strategy followed for currency 
unification epitomises this multi-speed 
approach – while also illustrating that 
it has reached its limits. Twenty years 
after it was launched in 1999, two of the 
then-15 EU members are still not part 
of the euro (excluding the UK). Clearly, 
this reflects some loosening of the 
indivisibility principle on the part of 
the EU. Although all member countries 
were nominally committed to joining 
the euro, some (Denmark and the UK) 
benefitted from a formal derogation. 
And as membership was based on 
objective criteria some (Sweden) were 
able to abstain from participating in 
the common currency by not fulfilling 
one requirement. Some members have 
also obtained opt-outs from justice 
cooperation and other areas.
Such management by exception is 
not sufficient anymore, because the 
European Union has become much 
more diverse than it was in 1999. 
Enlargement has contributed to this 
evolution. Moreover, as security has 
become more relevant, rifts have 
emerged because member states 
do not necessarily have the same 
perceptions of threats, do not devote 
the same resources to defence and 
security, and do not view the use of 
military force the same way. Finally, 
migration from third countries and 
the different political approaches to 
address the asylum and refugee issue 
have further exposed the depth of 
differences.
Such diversity has contributed to 
a growing mistrust between member 
states and in the European institutions. 
This in turn has made the goal of an 
ever-closer, federal union look more 
distant than ever. The vision of the 
unitary structure of the EU in which all 
27 members and half a dozen would-be 
members converge on the same goal is 
at odds with the large and increasing 
divergence of political pathways. The 
set of overlapping policy preferences 
has shrunk, followed inevitably by 
stasis and ineffectiveness. 
2.2 MAJORITY RULE 
This brings us to the second answer to 
the challenge of diversity. Historically, 
a way to deal with the stasis resulting 
from narrow overlapping policy pref-
erences in the areas where the EU has 
been bestowed with policy competence 
has been voting by majority in the 
Council. This has been, for example, 
the basis for the common trade policy 
(a field in which diversity was strong) 
and for the spectacular success of the 
internal market. Those outvoted would 
accept the majority decision; but the 
winners also knew that they could be 
outvoted in a coming decision.   
For decades, this approach has 
worked well for the mainly economic 
issues of market integration. There was 
a strong enough consensus on what the 
fundamental goal was for all to abide 
by the decisions taken. But we are now 
forced to deal with policy areas and 
priorities far removed from the mere 
economic sphere. Many of the present 
policy challenges are in areas that 
touch on questions of constitutional 
rules and prerogatives, national 
sovereignty or national identity. This 
makes it nearly impossible to find 
solutions among 27 member countries 
all resenting being outvoted or left 
out. Moreover, regular democratic 
procedures tend to be substituted by 
intergovernmental negotiations.
2.3 INCREASING INEFFECTIVENESS
The limits to the traditional ways of 
overcoming obstacles are apparent in 
four major fields in which the EU has 
been confronted by the challenge of 
heterogeneity: asylum, the euro, for-
eign and security policy, and external 
economic relations:  
• In terms of migration policy, a 
majority decision was taken on the 
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distribution of refugees between 
the 28 EU countries, but despite the 
EU Court of Justice judging it to be 
in line with EU law, is the decision 
has not been fully implemented2. 
Aiming to overcome the stalemate, 
the European Council has taken the 
lead on the migration issue with a 
very substantial amount of time of 
its discussion time devoted to the 
topic in recent years. But the result-
ing compromises remain ineffective 
and institutionally fuzzy.3
• The euro presents a challenge of a 
different nature. The problem with 
it arises at its core from the fact that 
monetary policy is centralised while 
fiscal policy is decided at national 
level. And while national decisions 
are loosely coordinated, the con-
straints imposed by monetary union 
are resented. This overlap between 
EU and national competence opens 
the way to conflicts over the direc-
tion of policy.   
The governance of this incom-
plete monetary union has evolved 
considerably since the crisis, with 
various institutions gaining and los-
ing importance. It is fair to describe 
the new system as increasingly 
strengthening intergovernmental 
institutions, such as the Europe-
an Stability Mechanism. Still, this 
trend is not uniform across policy 
areas. As a consequence, the overall 
governance picture has become 
extremely complex and the euro 
area’s institutional and democratic 
foundations remain weak. There are 
also a number of friction points be-
tween euro area and non-euro area 
EU countries.
• EU member states have committed 
themselves to a common foreign 
and security policy, coordinated and 
chaired by the High Representative, 
supported by the European External 
Action Service4. But despite this, key 
foreign and security policies continue 
to be driven by member states acting 
either separately or through coalitions 
of the willing5. Meanwhile, neigh-
bourhood policy is not considered a 
foreign policy issue and institutional 
responsibility for it lies with the Euro-
pean Commission. This state of affairs 
is suboptimal because unilateral 
member state decisions can impact all 
and Europe’s hand externally is weak. 
This is why Chancellor Merkel has 
voiced the idea of creating a European 
Security Council6  that would drive the 
big strategic foreign policy choices7
• Finally, while in external economic 
relations (financial stability, ex-
change-rate policy, trade policy, 
international regulatory coordina-
tion and the extraterritorial aspects 
of competition policy) the EU does 
have a functioning decision-mak-
ing system and is able to make 
its weight felt, its policy scope is 
incomplete. It does not cover in-
struments to deal with investments 
in security-relevant infrastructures 
or sectors, and it does not have a 
functional framework for cyberse-
curity issues. Nor does the EU have 
effective mechanisms to deal with 
industrial policy strategies and 
fiscal policy instruments to react to 
external trade and technology chal-
lenges. Moreover, the EU’s strength 
in economic relations is clearly 
hampered by its weakness in foreign 
and security policy.
In our view, the EU has reached the 
limits of what it can sensibly achieve 
within the framework of the current 
treaty order. The assumption that 
an ever-closer-union of 27, or more, 
member states will all reach the same 
final goal has, in itself, become a cause 
of ineffectiveness. A new structure 
is necessary for Europe to prevent 
internal stalemate and articulate its 
political will effectively at global level. 
On one hand, heterogeneity 
needs to be dealt with by accepting 
and reflecting it in the institutional 
structure, not by trying to outvote or 
outsmart member states. On the other 
hand, this requires member states 
to make tough choices and accept 
certain responsibilities. Participating 
in endeavours such as Schengen or 
2.   Despite the fact that the 
Treaty commits all member 
states to a common asylum 
policy, Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán has 
claimed there cannot be 
compromise in the migrant 
debate because “There is 
no document that we are 
aware of which states that 
if you enter the European 
Union you must become an 
immigrant country”, a view 
which is clearly shared by 
other leaders in Europe. 
See Orbán (2018).
3.  It remains unclear who is in 
charge of negotiating with 
third countries on behalf 
of the EU. Meanwhile 
the relationship between 
national and European 
institutions that deal with 
migrants is in constant flux. 
Importantly, the very prin-
ciple of a common asylum 
policy is rejected by some.
4.  Institutionally, the EEAS 
and the High Represent-
ative are attached to both 
the European Commission 
and the Council.
5.  For example, the war in 
Libya – despite its massive 
effects on all members of 
the EU – was mostly driven 
by the actions of two EU 
member states.
6.  See for example: https://
www.euractiv.com/
section/defence-and-se-
curity/news/germa-
ny-ready-to-take-more-re-
sponsibility-in-euro-
pean-defence-poli-
cy-says-merkel/.
7.  Perthes (2018) even goes 
as far as to say that the EU 
mechanisms are largely 
pointless and the big three 
countries should cooperate 
instead.
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the euro comes with the assumption 
of responsibility and shared 
sovereignty, including the possibility 
of being outvoted. The core of the EU 
institutional debate should reflect 
exactly this tension between adapting 
institutions to deal with heterogeneity 
and ensuring that member states live 
up to their obligations and accept the 
inevitable transfer of sovereignty.
3  TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The necessity of a more flexible struc-
ture is increasingly recognised, includ-
ing by heads of state and government 
such as President Macron of France, 
who has called for a “Europe of several 
circles” (Macron, 2018). What insti-
tutional structures are necessary for 
Europe to deal with global challenges 
in an efficient and politically legitimate 
way? Any strategy for the future should 
start from clear answers to three basic 
questions: 
• Is the acquis divisible? Although the 
response so far has been that it is 
not, in a culturally and politically 
varied Europe there is in fact no 
fundamental reason why the EU 
should uphold the indivisibility 
principle. Naturally, there are sig-
nificant complementarities across 
policies that must be preserved – 
for example, between integration 
within the single market, competi-
tion, consumer protection and core 
social principles. But not all policy 
spheres are as tightly linked to each 
other. It is for example perfectly 
imaginable to have a common trade 
policy but separate asylum policies. 
• What are the key complementarities 
between the EU’s competences? In 
other words, which of the 35 chap-
ters of the acquis can be separated 
and which cannot? As the EU was 
conceived as a single undertaking, 
this has not been written down: 
the complementarities between its 
competences have so far not been 
formalised. But if room is to be 
made for a more flexible mode of in-
tegration, an essential requirement 
is that spillovers are taken care of. 
In other words there must be no 
cherry-picking. The delineation of 
indivisible complementarities is a 
prerequisite for more flexible Euro-
pean integration.
• Can some countries move back-
wards? The Brexit referendum has 
shown that membership of the EU 
is not irreversible. Negotiations so 
far have been conducted under the 
assumption that there is no middle 
way between being in or out. But if 
a country can choose to leave, and 
assuming integration patterns be-
come more flexible, why can it not 
be allowed to withdraw from certain 
integration areas, for example, from 
security cooperation while remain-
ing part of the single market? The 
lock-in principle that has applied 
to European integration so far is 
ill-suited to address the problems 
that the demand for more nation-
al autonomy raises. However, we 
acknowledge that a system without 
any lock-in, in which, say, changes 
in government trigger changes in 
membership, would be clearly un-
manageable and incompatible with 
European ambitions. 
If one accepts that a unitary 
structure is increasingly impossible to 
achieve in a diverse European Union 
that seems set to remain diverse, and 
is possibly also not desirable, one 
needs to design appropriate levels 
of flexibility. In order to design the 
necessary legal and institutional 
framework for flexible integration, 
there is a choice to be made between 
a concentric circles model and a clubs 
model.
3.1 CONCENTRIC CIRCLES
In a model of concentric circles mem-
bers can choose – from a commonly 
agreed set of possibilities – the level of 
integration that corresponds to their 
wishes at a certain point in time. This 
may not preclude them from changing 
their minds, but there is no presump-
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8. There is no reason, for 
example, to consider 
that all member states 
participating in a common 
asylum policy would also 
participate in the euro – 
nor vice-versa.  
tion that all should gradually move to-
wards closer integration. Whereas each 
level provides a possible stepping stone 
to supplementary integration, it is 
designed in such a way that it provides 
a basis for a self-contained, stable and 
coherent arrangement. By the same 
token there could not be a menu of 
options to match different preferences 
within a given level of integration. In 
this model, the inner circle would have 
the highest level of integration across 
all policy areas, while the outer circle 
would have the loosest. And there can 
be one or several circles between the 
inner and outer circles.   
The great advantage of this 
model is its legal and institutional 
simplicity. Importantly, it can preserve 
institutional unity in full, provided 
the institution in charge safeguards 
the rights of the member states not 
participating in further levels of 
integration. This is for example what 
the European Commission attempts 
to do in relation to non-euro area 
member states – though not always to 
their satisfaction. 
The downside of the concentric circles 
model is obviously that it offers only 
limited, and potentially insufficient, 
flexibility. In a context in which member 
states differ in their policy preferences, 
it might prove too rigid, especially when 
integration encompasses separate policy 
areas such as economic, security and 
migration policy8. 
Moreover, countries in the outer 
circles might feel dominated by the inner 
circle without having their say. 
3.2 A EUROPE OF CLUBS
A club model would be designed to 
offer exactly this greater degree of 
flexibility: it would consist of a limit-
ed number of stable, self-contained 
and coherent arrangements in which 
member states can participate. But 
participating countries would be free 
to choose to take part in certain clubs 
and disregard some others. A further 
important difference compared to a 
concentric circles model would be the 
absence of a hierarchy of relationship 
intensity between the different clubs – 
there is no inner circle of countries that 
somehow ‘owns’ the overall project and 
determines its overall direction.  
Institutionally a club model is 
harder to design and put in place 
than a concentric circles model, first 
because it risks inconsistency and 
cherry-picking, and even more so 
because it might not be compatible 
with institutional unity. For example, it 
is difficult to say who should nominate 
the commissioners, elect the members 
of parliament and appoint the 
judges – or even what the role of the 
Commission, the European Parliament 
and CJEU would be – in an EU in which 
certain members would participate 
in a euro club, while others would 
participate in an asylum club. The risk 
of an arrangement of this sort is that 
it could inevitably lead to a purely 
intergovernmental structure, with no 
role for European institutions. It might 
also be politically harder to achieve 
because the overall ownership of the 
project might be missing.
For a club model to be workable 
there should therefore at least be 
a common overall basis on which 
to build. This basis should entail a 
common treaty framework that would 
lay out the essential principles, cover a 
common set of fundamental policies in 
which all countries would participate, 
and provide the common institutional 
apparatus consisting of an executive, a 
parliament and a court of justice. There 
should be no club membership without 
participation in this common basis. 
The Europe of Clubs has advantages 
in that it provides a higher degree 
of flexibility to accommodate 
member states’ political preferences. 
However, it would lead to patchwork 
of overlapping structures of a rather 
voluntarist nature, and risk being at the 
whim of changing political climates. 
More importantly, it would lack a 
clear structure that would enable it 
to engage and negotiate with third 
countries in a meaningful manner.
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4  A PROPOSAL FOR A HYBRID MODEL
We have considered two models: a Eu-
rope of concentric circles and a Europe 
of clubs. 
In what follows we offer a hybrid 
template that combines elements of 
these two models in order to overcome 
their respective weaknesses. Note that 
we do not here discuss how to manage 
transition from the current system to a 
new one. Our aim in what follows is to 
foster debate. In practice, the starting 
point must always be the current 
institutional structure, which is strong 
and meaningful, but which we also 
consider too rigid to be sustainable in 
the long term.
4.1 THE BASE: A BARE-BONES EU
The first step would be to design 
a basis for cooperation between 
European countries that is able 
to include many partners but is 
comprehensive and involves sufficient 
commitment to ensure sustainable 
performance. A bare-bones EU, 
stripped of the non-essentials of the 
present union, should provide the 
basis of European cooperation. It 
should consist of a set of policies and 
an institutional system in which all EU 
members must participate.
The bare-bones EU should be 
narrower in scope than today’s EU. It 
should be built around the customs 
union and the single market, together 
with the set of policies that are 
indispensable to make them viable. 
Policies indispensable to the 
functioning of the single market 
should certainly include consumer 
protection, competition policy, trade 
policy, sectoral policies with a direct 
bearing on the functioning of the 
market for goods and services – such as 
transport and trans-European networks 
– and arguably taxation. Regional 
development should also be included. 
Major policies excluded from 
the common base would be: first, 
the economic and monetary union 
and its flanking policies such as 
banking union and macroeconomic 
coordination; second, asylum policy, 
and the Schengen area; third, foreign 
and security policy and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. Disagreements between 
countries over these three sets of 
policies typically occur more often 
than over the single market, and these 
three sets of policies are not essential 
to achieve economic integration9.
We also think that the common base 
should involve binding commitments 
to democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights of the person, 
the citizen and the worker. The EU 
was historically created as a political 
project between countries that shared 
a common, adversarial history and 
regarded as essential the promotion 
of democracy and human rights. 
Fundamental social rights, such as 
equality between men and women or 
the freedom to participate in unions, 
should also be regarded as part of the 
basic rights. These values would form 
the basis of the bare-bones EU.    
We consider that such a bare-
bones EU would be more inclusive of 
willing partners in the continent, such 
as non-EU European Economic Area 
(EEA) countries. But for countries 
that do not want to participate in all 
four freedoms of the single market, 
especially the free movement of labour, 
a different partnership structure 
would need to be created, a sort of 
outer circle, in order to establish 
close economic relations but not 
participation in a political project. We 
return to this idea below. 
4.2 THE TOP UP: CLUBS
For countries that wish to maintain and 
build a degree of integration beyond 
bare-bones economic integration, a 
club approach appears promising. The 
number of clubs needs to be strictly 
limited, however, because otherwise 
the construction would degenerate into 
a loose arrangement with members 
picking and choosing the policies that 
suit them best. 
The clubs arrangement would rely 
on the common substantive, legal 
and institutional basis provided by 
9. Our bare-bones EU is 
therefore comparable 
to scenario 1 in the 
Commission’s March 2017 
white paper (see footnote 
1) or the first pillar of the 
EU treaties without the 
economic and monetary 
union and the asylum and 
Schengen policies.
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the treaty governing the bare-bones 
EU. Each club would be supported by 
specific institutions – at minimum, 
a Council formation based on the 
membership of the club and some 
form of secretariat/executive. This 
secretariat would typically be provided 
by the Commission and would be 
complemented by specific institutions/
agencies, as is the case for the euro 
club with the European Central Bank 
and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). It could also be supplied by a 
Council-based body, especially in the 
case of defence for which participating 
countries would presumably want to 
avoid sharing control of decisions with 
non-participating countries. It would 
also be necessary, in certain areas, to 
assign responsibility for oversight and 
legislation to a sub-chamber of the 
European Parliament composed of the 
MEPs from the participating countries.
The unity of the overall architecture 
would be ensured by the breadth and 
strength of the legal and institutional 
basis provided by the bare-bones EU. 
It would be supported by a common 
court system that would uphold the 
consistency of legal decisions taken 
within the framework of the various 
clubs. The basis of the bare-bones EU 
and of the clubs therefore would be the 
applicability of a single legal system 
– which is indeed the core of the EU 
(Hallstein, 1969; Hallstein, 1973). And 
while there would be institutional 
continuity for the clubs in terms of the 
institutional base, they would have 
different decision-making processes, 
different executives and different lines 
of accountability.
In many respects, the club structure 
would resemble an advanced version 
of the EU’s enhanced cooperation 
framework. It would differ, however, 
in terms of scale and in the fact that 
it would involve defining explicit and 
not necessarily identical institutional 
structures for each of the clubs.
The real value added of establishing 
clubs would be to allow member 
countries to opt out in cases of big 
issues for which they might prefer to 
apply their own policies. This would 
depressurise the system and allow 
smoother cooperation in areas where 
preferences align more closely.
4.3 A CONCRETE SCHEME
We propose an architecture combining 
the bare-bones EU and four clubs to 
deal with:
• Economic and Monetary Union 
consisting of the euro and flanking 
policies, such as macroeconomic 
policy coordination and banking 
union; 
• Migration, asylum and Schengen: 
we regard these policy areas as 
linked because an area without 
internal border controls cannot 
be maintained between countries 
whose immigration and asylum 
policies differ markedly; 
• Security and foreign policy 
arrangements;
• All the remaining, current EU 
policies not covered by the bare-
bones set up. These would include 
policy areas in which today’s EU 
has only supporting or coordinating 
competences.  
Countries will choose to be part 
of the bare-bones EU alone, or to 
participate in addition in one or more 
clubs. However, participation in the 
bare-bones set-up will not require 
eventual participation in any of the 
clubs. Implementing this proposal 
would ultimately require restructuring 
the EU treaties to separate out 
provisions relevant to the bare-
bones EU and provisions relevant 
to the four clubs, and to establish 
the corresponding institutional 
architecture. 
For clubs to be effective, they will 
need to have strong and legitimate 
decision-making structures. The 
balance between Community and 
Intergovernmental methods will not 
need to be the same for all clubs. The 
Community method is, for example, 
better suited to governing the euro 
than to organising security policy 
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cooperation.  
In principle, nevertheless, it would 
be desirable to rely in all cases on a clear 
double-hat institutional structure with 
a Council and a Parliament, in each 
case formed only by the participating 
member countries. These would be the 
co-legislators within the club structure, 
and they would hold the executive of 
that club to account. This would be 
a long-run federal vision – which we 
realise may raise deep constitutional 
concerns at the national level.
In the foreseeable future, the clubs 
would therefore de facto be based on 
different, more intergovernmental 
and sometimes complex governance 
structures. Whenever resources from 
outside the EU budget are required, 
decision-making processes might still 
need to rely on unanimity voting in 
council formation – reflecting the fact 
that national tax resources are on the 
line. Only in the longer term could 
the development of own resources be 
envisaged. 
Also in terms of which executive 
acts in a particular matter, the different 
clubs would have different structures. 
Overall, we would prefer a fairly 
unitary model with the Commission 
being by default the executive of the 
clubs. However, we realise that in the 
foreseeable future, various agencies 
might take charge of the execution of 
the clubs’ key policies: for example 
there would be a common agency 
for the protection of refugees, or 
a common agency – the ESM – for 
financial assistance to euro-area 
countries.  But the most important 
point is that each club would be based 
on the same bare-bones EU legal 
system and would be subject to the 
same court – as is currently the case for 
the ESM which, although it is not based 
on the EU treaties but on a specific 
treaty, falls under the jurisdiction of 
the CJEU. 
4.4 A WIDER EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP
How would this structure deal with 
countries outside the EU? For a start, 
we believe that the bare-bones EU 
as we have defined it would have a 
significantly lower degree of political 
ambition than the current EU, which 
is why we could imagine more coun-
tries joining. In particular, the non-EU 
EEA countries would fare better inside 
the bare-bones EU than outside the 
current EU since they would essential-
ly remain in the single market but ac-
quire membership of the (bare-bones) 
EU decision-making process. 
The EU also needs to better 
manage its relationship with other 
non-EU neighbours, such as Turkey, 
Switzerland, the Western Balkan 
countries and the UK. For these 
countries, the establishment of 
a structure that replicates some 
elements of membership might be 
the right way to form a partnership. 
Instead of a purely hub-and-spoke 
structure, as is currently the case 
with existing agreements, this new 
arrangement should be given a 
participative form and a multilateral 
structure, so that participating 
countries inside and outside the 
EU would be involved in policy-
shaping processes. However, they 
should clearly not be allowed to 
fundamentally interfere with the 
decision-making process of the bare-
bones EU. 
We therefore propose, as an outer 
circle, a European partnership in 
which far less integration is achieved 
but that would still involve multilateral 
features. If and when agreed, the 
future framework for the relationship 
between the UK and the EU would 
provide a natural basis for such a 
wider partnership, but there are other 
possible cooperation options for the 
outer ring of friends. 
This partnership would provide a 
conduit to membership for candidate 
countries whose level of economic and 
institutional development makes full 
participation in the EU questionable. It 
could also provide a framework for the 
relationship with Turkey, Ukraine or 
other regional partners. 
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4.5 TRANSITING IN AND OUT
Managing this greater flexibility needs 
to come with clear answers to the fol-
lowing questions:
• Who decides where each country 
belongs? In a permanent regime, 
deciding which club they wish to 
belong to would first and foremost 
be for the countries themselves. 
However, existing club members 
would also need to agree who 
joins. Establishing clear criteria 
for entry and obligations for new 
members once they have joined 
will be crucial. Getting rid of the 
presumption that all member 
states are ultimately expected to 
participate in all integration circles 
would certainly help to enforce 
strict decision-making procedures. 
As far as the bare-bones EU is 
concerned, the existing conditions 
(Copenhagen criteria, accession 
chapters) would apply.
• Can countries exit a club? This 
should be possible, because for 
as long as nation states exist, an 
obligation to remain a member is 
not credible. Moreover, the fear 
of long-term commitment might 
deter countries from joining alto-
gether. There should therefore be 
clearly spelled-out exit procedures 
that could be activated by a coun-
try itself or by its partners in case 
of lasting infringements of mem-
bership obligations. However, the 
level of institutional commitment 
that, for example, euro member-
ship requires does not make such 
reversals operational policy choic-
es. These are decisions countries 
should make in full knowledge of 
the need for generational commit-
ments that are not meant to be re-
versed. Enshrining club member-
ship in national constitutions and 
requiring that the constitution be 
changed before a request for exit 
is made could be a way of ensuring 
stability.
• Can a country exit a bare-bones 
EU? The Brexit precedent shows 
that nothing is irreversible. How-
ever, the hurdles for undoing 
membership need to be substantial 
in order to ensure continuity and 
avoid capture in political cycles. 
Nevertheless, establishing clear 
processes for giving up member-
ship reduces uncertainty and the 
risk pressure within inflexible 
systems. Article 50 and the Brexit 
jurisprudence would apply.
5 CONCLUSIONS 
As the world is changing, Europe has 
to change. It can be a bystander or it 
can take action. Muddling through 
will no longer be sufficient. To be 
effective the EU and Europe more 
broadly must deal with Europe’s issue 
of heterogeneity in a structural man-
ner. This needs to be done by accept-
ing that not all European countries 
wish to share all areas of integration 
that some see as desirable, or even 
necessary. The counterpart to this 
institutional flexibility should be an 
acceptance by those members that do 
participate that being in a club comes 
with responsibilities, not only rights. 
A bare-bones EU coupled with a 
Europe of clubs would offer in our 
view scope for broad membership 
without stalling the process of 
integration for those that wish 
to pursue it. The bare-bones EU 
would need to include the rule of 
law and a commitment to common 
values. In the economic field it 
would encompass the single market 
and the necessary complementary 
policies, including a single trade 
and investment policy. The bare-
bones EU would be surrounded by 
a “ring of friends” (Prodi, 2002) with 
significantly less integration but still 
meaningful economic relations and a 
framework for multilateral dialogue. 
The clubs, in turn, would 
entail constitutionally binding 
commitments by their members to 
share sovereignty in areas that are 
politically more sensitive, such as the 
euro, asylum policy and security and 
foreign policy. Participation in clubs 
would be voluntary, but movement 
in and out of clubs would face high 
barriers.
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Such a scheme would remove the 
all-or-nothing approach to European 
integration, which does not match 
all countries’ wishes and on which 
progress has stopped. We believe 
that it would also be an effective 
way of reinforcing democracy. In 
the current system, the resistance of 
some member states often leads to 
an increased reliance on negotiations 
within the European Council and 
the increased predominance of the 
unanimity rule. Greater internal 
effectiveness would also make the 
bare-bones EU coupled with a Europe 
of clubs more effective externally, 
but only if its external representation 
is upgraded and adapted to the new 
structure.
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